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The ‘Deserving’ Victims of Political Violence:




Northern Ireland has an unenviable record of political violence and, as a direct consequence, victims who have suffered fatally or sustained serious injuries. Some 3,600 deaths are recorded resulting from the political conflict since 1969, of which 53% were civilians having no paramilitary status​[1]​. Northern Ireland’s bloody history of the last 30 years is replete with terrorist atrocities, some of which are etched in the national and international conscience. The most horrific incidents bear all the hallmarks of senseless barbarity. The Omagh bomb placed in a busy town centre in 1998 killed 29 people; the Shankill Road shop bombing took the lives of 10 people in 1993. In retaliation 7 people were shot dead in the Greysteel bar massacre and the Enniskillen Poppy Day bomb in 1987 where 11 people died, are but a few of the more heinous tragedies. These major terrorist atrocities understandably overshadowed a sustained campaign of bombings and killings which generated an accumulating inventory of ‘anonymous’ victims of terrorist violence. These have been captured most poignantly in Lost Lives a chilling catalogue of those killed during ‘the troubles’ which lists in consecutive order of time of death, each person killed, their identity, the manner and location of their death and the organisation responsible (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, 1999).

Preconceived notions of perpetrators and victims of violence in Northern Ireland have been politically contested in ways which suggest there are those who are ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ of victimhood status or different perceptions of ‘who has suffered most’ (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth, 1999:56). This paper examines the particular case of those who have been subjected to paramilitary ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings. It questions the assumption that the victims ‘deserve’ the often brutal summary justice meted out by paramilitaries. In so doing it provides evidence of how and why this type of ongoing violence has become integral to the way in which paramilitaries ‘police’ their areas despite the existence of cease-fires. Hence descriptions of what constitutes violence are redefined conditional upon political standards now referred to in Northern Ireland as having ‘an imperfect peace’ or ‘an acceptable level of violence’. That the culpability of the victims of such attacks is assumed, only reinforces the role of paramilitaries in acting as community protectors. 

This paper researches paramilitary ‘punishment’ attacks from the perspective of the victims and those communities which condone this type of violence, drawing on first-hand accounts through interviews and data gathered in community focus groups. A total of 40 in-depth interviews were conducted with those who have been subjected to paramilitary attacks and their experiences recorded. Access and selection were negotiated through gatekeeper organisations such as the Probation Board, victims’ support groups and the voluntary/community sector – sampling was therefore purposive. Four focus groups were held in different loyalist and republican areas to assess community perceptions of the ‘alternative criminal justice system’ and strategies aimed at tackling ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings. The areas selected represented a mix of loyalist and republican strongholds, with and without access to restorative justice programmes.

The political profile of victims

The plight of victims and the enduring suffering of their families has recently assumed a much greater public prominence and become a policy issue of some concern for the British Government and local political parties alike. The clearest evidence of this was the appointment of a Victims Commissioner in November 1997 by the then Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, to ‘look at ways to recognise the pain and suffering felt by victims of violence arising from the troubles, including those who have died or been injured in the service of the community’ (Bloomfield, 1998: 8). Similarly politicians signing up to the Belfast Agreement believed it was ‘essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation’ (Belfast Agreement, 1998:18). The Victims Commissioner reported in April 1998 (We Will Remember Them: Bloomfield, 1998) with a series of economic welfare, counselling and support measures aimed at those with injuries or relatives of the dead. These included the appointment of a Minister for Victims (Adam Ingram) to be the ‘listening ear’ for victims of the troubles; establishment of a new trauma unit; a victims’ liaison unit to drive the process forward; grants to community and voluntary sector to implement the report’s proposals; an educational bursary scheme to provide assistance to children and young adults who lost a parent or had become a victim of the troubles in some other way; and a memorial fund for victims who suffer financial hardship.  The Prime Minister indicated that £5m was available as a down-payment to support the recommendations flowing from the Victims Commissioner’s report. 

Victims and their families were somewhat cynical of the government’s new-found concern, describing it as ‘too little, too late’. Some viewed such moves as no more than a necessary part of the political and public relations management of the prisoners’ early-release programme​[2]​ within which victims were mere pawns in the wider unstoppable agenda for a peace deal. Typical of this view is Robert Sergeant whose father was killed in the Mount Inn Bar in north Belfast. He had to seek psychiatric help to deal with the trauma of having to identify his father’s face which was still bloody from the head and neck wounds inflicted by the gunman. He did not qualify under the victim support scheme and commented: ‘I am literally struggling week to week while prisoners are getting assistance and being released. I have suffered mentally; support for victims of trauma has come many years too late’ (Purdy, 1998: 4). Despite palliative comments from the Minister for Victims that ‘the release of prisoners is bound to bring home the grief, reopen the suffering and all my concern is focused on the human feelings of victims directly affected’, this was seen by some as a deft political gesture in anticipation of the outcry over prisoner releases (Ingram, 1998). Providing economic assistance to victims also acted as a counterbalance to the well-organised and funded ex-prisoners welfare and training programmes, many of which had benefited from public funds. Given the importance ascribed to victims in the unfolding political agenda, the IRA also felt compelled to provide information to families on burial places of ‘the disappeared’; those murdered and secretly buried during the ‘troubles’. Although offered as a gesture of good faith on the part of republicans, it subsequently proved counterproductive under the full glare of negative publicity surrounding unsuccessful digs carried out mainly by the Garda Siochána. Three bodies were uncovered but the absence of precise information on the whereabouts of other secret graves led to efforts being abandoned, much to the distress of the victims’ families. This new emphasis on those who have suffered has generated a fundamental debate about who precisely are the victims of political violence in Northern Ireland. 


Victims and perpetrators– ambiguity and contestation

The victim/perpetrator dichotomy is fraught with problems when considering political violence in Northern Ireland. Definitions of victims abound. The Victims Commissioner defined them in two ways – those who have died as a consequence of conflict; and the surviving injured and those who care for them, together with those relatives who mourn the dead (Bloomfield: 1998: 2.2 & 2.13). In a parallel commission established in the Republic of Ireland to review whether the services within its jurisdiction met the needs of those who had suffered from the conflict in Northern Ireland, a narrower approach was adopted. Victims were defined as ‘those directly affected by acts of violence, rather than indirectly affected by the troubles in general’ (Wilson, 1999: 5).  The more legally based UN definition of a victim​[3]​ is ‘anyone who has suffered harm as a result of violation of criminal laws, regardless of whether a perpetrator has been identified or is being dealt with by the criminal justice system’. A victim may include, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and others who have suffered harm in intervening to help victims or prevent victimisation (Criminal Justice Review Group, 2000: 322).

Whilst these definitions may appear theoretically plausible, in practice however the term ‘victim’ has become contested and politicised, resulting in an ambiguous distinction between victim and perpetrator. Smyth, for example, poses the question whether ‘we are all victims’ by drawing on the Victims Commission Report which states ‘no-one living in Northern Ireland will have escaped some degree of damage’ (Bloomfield cited by Smyth, 1998: 34). Smyth dismisses this ‘as neither a viable or advisable way to approach the past’ but goes on to argue: 

Many of us have given support to acts of violence by our covert support or at least for not vocalising opposition...The direct use of violence may have been the role of relatively few in the society, but the few cannot carry out their acts of violence without the support of the many. Therefore there is merit in the idea that we are all perpetrators to some extent  (Smyth, 1998: 41). 

Not that perpetrators are necessarily ‘wrongdoers’. It appears there are certain circumstances when perpetrating violence can be seen as ‘acceptable’. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Report in South Africa, for example, accused the African National Congress of gross human rights violations, but made it clear that its struggle against apartheid was justified, including the use of armed force. There could be no equivalence, it argued, between evils of the apartheid system and the abuses, however serious and including murder, which the ANC members committed. The State as a perpetrator of violence is not uncommon and its role may not always be overt. The role of vigilantes in South Africa, El Salvador and the Philippines, which received no official recognition, was politically directed and became a mode of repression adopted by the governing regimes.

The ambiguity around victimhood status is compounded in Northern Ireland because one of the protagonists to the conflict is the British Government. Hence when the State is either directly or indirectly involved in violence, the status of the victims is often contested. Ní Aoláin’s (2000) recent research into 350 deaths caused by agents of the state between 1969 – 1994 illustrates this and several examples serve to highlight the point. The events of Bloody Sunday (Derry/Londonderry, January 1972), in which 13 men were shot dead and a further 13 injured from gunshots by the soldiers of the Parachute Regiment, have been defended as a legitimate response to a sustained gun and bomb attack on the British Army by the IRA. The Coroner (Major Hubert O’Neill), on the other hand, stated ‘the Army ran amok that day without thinking what they were doing. They were shooting innocent people’. Whether the State was perpetrator or victim of violence is the subject of an ongoing enquiry into the affair launched by Tony Blair in January 1998.

The vexed case of Paratrooper Lee Clegg raises similar issues. Clegg was found guilty of murdering Karen Reilly, a passenger in a stolen car which broke through an army road block in west Belfast (September 1990). He was originally convicted in June 1993 and jailed for life, but was released on licence within two years by former Secretary of State Mayhew to resume his army career. Despite appeals to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, his conviction stood until a re-trail was ordered in 1998. Lee Clegg was finally cleared of murdering Karen Reilly in March 1999 because the judge could not be certain that he fired the shot which killed the teenager. Joe Hendron, former SDLP MP for west Belfast, reacted with the comment: ‘the facts are that these two young people in a car (O’Reilly and the driver) were summarily executed by the elite of the British Army’. The defence case was that the paratrooper, fearing a terrorist attack, had fired into the side of the car in self-defence and to protect other soldiers on patrol with him. Clegg has been variously described as a victim and as a perpetrator. The law itself blurs the distinction at times, by allowing a person to use reasonable force to defend himself or herself against perceived attack.

The State’s response to sectarian violence has also posed challenges. The case of Robert Hamill, beaten to death by a loyalist mob in Portadown town centre in April 1997 is a good example. The family criticised the RUC’s handling of the incident, claiming armed officers watched from a nearby Land Rover and failed to intervene as the attack took place. The RUC put out a press release immediately after the attack stating there had been a fight between rival factions and the police had come under attack. Their position changed to one in which they admitted the attack on Robert Hamill and his friends was unprovoked and their intervention unsuccessful as they were outnumbered. Did the State, through alleged inactivity on the part of the security forces, indirectly perpetuate violence? In his judgement, Lord Justice McCollum was unable to resolve the question of whether the police stayed in their Land Rover during the attack. The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently decided that there were no grounds to prosecute the officers for criminal neglect. The case has been linked by the Hamill family to the Stephen Lawrence racist killing in London as evidence of ‘institutionalised sectarianism and racism’ in the police handling of the incidents.

Rolston’s (2000) recent research presents not only a comprehensive account of the above examples (described as ‘innocent’ victims) but also summarises incidents such as Mairéad Farrell preparing for a bombing mission in Gibraltar and Patrick Kelly’s attack on an RUC barracks. He argued that it would be too easy to focus on the ‘innocent’ victims of state violence and leave out the latter ‘as somehow fouling the humanitarian pitch’ (Rolston, 2000: x). Rolston goes on to describe the differential treatment of victims as ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’. The latter he argues ‘are presumed to be less than innocent, or worse, downright culpable, implicated in their own suffering’ (Rolston, 2000: XI). Hence a hierarchy of victims exists, top of which are the ‘innocent’ – usually women and children killed by paramilitary violence, to the bottom which are members of paramilitary groups killed by state force. This hierarchy is legitimised through media reports describing innocent victims has having ‘no interest in politics’ or just ‘going about their daily work’. Rolston suggests this leads to the social construction of the ‘ideal victim’, central to which are two key elements – ‘innocence’ and ‘passivity’. 

The legitimacy of victim status has therefore been challenged. When Victims Minister Adam Ingram met with families of the IRA members shot dead in 1987 by the SAS at Loughgall (‘undeserving victims’ according to Rolston’s hierarchy), a major row erupted. The victims’ pressure group FAIR (Families Acting for Innocent Relatives) claimed that ‘these people were not victims - they caused the troubles’. Sinn Féin rebutted that no section of the population had a monopoly on suffering and the grief of all relatives (terrorists or their victims) was indistinguishable. The incident exemplifies the contested notion of what the Ulster Unionist Party described as ‘genuine victims of terrorism’. By contrast Le Vine has argued ‘that ‘victims’ are not necessary to definitions of terrorism, but more important, where ‘victims’ are involved, their ‘innocence’ (or ‘guilt’) may be largely irrelevant to the fact that they became ‘victims’ in the first place’ (Le Vine, 1997: 55). The status of victims of violence has become differentiated with examples of complete role reversal. The terms ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ have therefore taken on new meanings. Their gradation is a direct result of living in a conflict ridden society in which the role of violence and tolerance in its usage have been redefined.


‘Deserving’ victims of paramilitary violence

Nowhere is this ambiguity between victim and perpetrator more clearly illustrated than in the case of so called ‘punishment’ attacks carried out by paramilitaries on those engaging in ‘anti-social behaviour’. Paramilitaries claim they take action against petty criminals involved in burglary, car thief, joy riding and target more serious criminals such as alleged drug dealers and paedophiles. They administer ‘justice’ through a tariff system of warnings, threats, curfew, beatings, shootings, exiling and ultimately execution (Silke, 1998). Beatings are often carried out with baseball bats spiked with nails, hammers or power tools used on bones. Shots are aimed at the elbows or hands, and knees/ankles to exact maximum damage to the legs which can result in amputation. Up to the end of June 2000 police statistics show that there have been 2,303 shootings (an average of 85 per year) and 1,626 beatings (an average of 90 per year) since 1973 and 1982 respectively, when figures were first recorded​[4]​. These statistics however are thought to grossly underestimate the true extent of the problem. Those subjected to beatings and shootings are fearful of involving the security forces in case of paramilitary reprisal and hence there is large scale under reporting. They target those who speak out against their activities and, in so doing, violate their freedom of expression. Paramilitaries have also exiled individuals by forcing them to relocate (usually in England/Scotland) under threat of serious injury or death. They have been described as the ‘invisible victims’ of the troubles subject to loyalist and republican fatwas. Paramilitary groups, particularly republicans, rationalise their activities as policing their own communities in the absence of a ‘legitimate police force’. Communities are discouraged from going to the police as the experience is that charges will be dropped against the perpetrators in return for low-level intelligence information useful to the RUC. Loyalist paramilitaries, on the other hand, tend to engage in ‘punishment’ attacks as much to maintain discipline amongst their own members as to ‘police’ their areas (Silke, 1999). A typical view of how communities react to the perpetrators of crime in their areas and the role played by paramilitaries is as follows:

The informal justice system as it operates here and now isn’t an arbitrary one. People aren’t shot, for example, just for stealing a car. You’re talking about maybe someone with a history of crime stretching two or three years and it’s a last resort. The community puts pressure on the paramilitaries to go and deal with these people. They go through the whole process of curfews, warnings, and then at the end of it, it’s expulsion or punishment. The paramilitaries have no prisons to lock them up in but they’re given chances time and time again. There is a certain element that no matter what you do they’re going to go in that direction, and once they’re excluded from this community they come back hell bent on revenge. They systematically wreck it by burning cars in the middle of the road, attacking people’s houses seeking revenge. It becomes a war basically between the community and these individuals. So the paramilitaries are usually forced into a decision where they have to take punitive action against them. (Focus group interview, Twinbrook/Poleglass (Belfast), September 1999).
 
This sense of victimisation, particularly in the Greater Belfast area where many ‘punishment’ attacks occur, is indeed a ‘rational’ response when viewed in the context of crime statistics. The Police Authority for Northern Ireland which monitored the performance of the RUC during 1998/99 found ‘that many categories of crime are on the increase while police performance in tackling this has not always been as effective as anticipated’ (Police Authority for Northern Ireland, 1999:9). The report noted that the number of violent crimes​[5]​ rose by 21.2%, recorded crimes increased by 27.9% and crimes against the person went up by 33.2%. Crime statistics for 1999/00 reveal a further increase in these categories by 12.6%, 9.2% and 16.2% respectively (Report of the RUC Chief Constable, 1999/00). The Northern Ireland Crime Survey (1998) which reported fears of crime and perceptions of the likelihood of becoming a victim recorded higher victimisation rates (26%) in Belfast than other parts of Northern Ireland (West Northern Ireland had the lowest rates at 19%). Catholic respondents (24%) had higher victimisation rates than Protestants (20%) (Northern Ireland Office, 1999).

This suggests communities are being victimised by those seen as anti-social elements and are vulnerable because of the failing in the formal policing system. Fear of crime is not therefore ‘irrational’, and because ‘justice’ is administered through third party paramilitaries, people appear to be more punitive towards lawbreakers. This is somewhat at odds with victims’ attitudes towards treatment of offenders highlighted in early British Crime Surveys (Hough, 1986, Walklate, 1989). In these circumstances the distinction between victim and perpetrator is ambiguous at best. The victim is redefined as the perpetrator of some previous crime(s) against the community and the ‘punishment’ depicted as the means of attaining ‘fair’ retribution. The labelling of the ‘victim’ as ‘perpetrator’ may be compounded by their subsequent treatment under the law​[6]​. The Secretary of State is empowered to refuse or reduce compensation if the victim was in any way responsible through provocative or negligent behaviour for the incident in which he/she was injured. The Victims Commissioner described this provision in law as ‘lending weight to a pernicious conclusion that it was really his/her own fault’ (Bloomfield, 1998: 27). 

Definitions of violence according to Richardson and May (1999) revolve around culpability, victimisation and what is deemed socially appropriate behaviour in particular contexts. Accordingly, the notion of deservedness or the idea that ‘to a greater of lesser extent a person ‘deserves’ the violence they experience, is not only related to understandings of the social contexts in which violence is thought likely to occur, but is also mediated through the social characteristics of the victim’ (Richardson and May, 1999: 309). They exemplify this by considering violence against lesbians and gay men, who because of their marginalised and stigmatised status are likely to be perceived as a potential threat, for example through the spread of AIDS. Because their culpability is in doubt, they are unlikely to be seen as innocent victims of violence. Conversely, Christie (1986: 18) describes the ‘ideal victim as a person or category of individuals who, when hit by crime, most readily are given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim’. Elderly victims of robberies, burglaries and assaults, children who are sexually abused, victims of medical negligence, come close to the ‘ideal victim’. Similarly Edgar and O’Donnell’s research on assaults in prisons highlights the fact the ‘the victim’s attributes, attitudes or behaviour significantly increases the likelihood of assault’ (Edgar and O’Donnell, 1998: 636). Miers’ (2000) research draws attention to victims’ self empowerment in the face of their frustration with the criminal justice system, reinforced by the Conservative Government’s 1980s market ideology of ‘do-it-yourself’ justice or private responsibility for crime prevention. The excessive or misplaced exercise of direct justice, he argues, ‘threatens rather than supports, the claimed values implicit in the criminal justice system, as well as the values implicit in claiming the status of, or being labelled, a victim’ (Miers, 2000: 83). In short, victims become perpetrators of violence, either directly or vicariously. 

The parallel with victims of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland is striking. The majority of victims are men in their twenties (25% are under 20 years of age) who are beaten or shot in urban paramilitary heartlands, the areas in which they live (Feenan, 1999). These individuals are identified as the ‘type of person’ who is likely to be involved in ‘hooding’ (anti-social behaviour) and therefore a ‘deserving’ victim of paramilitary violence. The result is that the culpability of the paramilitaries as perpetrators of violence is significantly reduced through their role as community protectors. Moreover, both the organs of the State and the media can reinforce the status of victims as ‘deserving’ of violence. In the case of the former one official from the Compensation Agency explaining how they processed claims for injuries sustained by a paramilitary attack said: ‘we don’t assume with every other applicant that they’re going to have a lengthy criminal record but with a ‘punishment’ attack I think we maybe do have a predisposition to think ‘there will be a criminal record here’ (interview with Compensation Agency Official, December 1998). In the latter The Mail on Sunday ran an article claiming young men were voluntarily undergoing ‘kneecapping’ by punishment squads to earn compensation which would fund holidays and settle debts (Foggo, 2000). Despite the absence of evidence to support this assertion, the paper went beyond characterising these young men as ‘deserving’ victims by portraying their injuries as self-inflicted.
The ‘deserving’ status of victims is further reinforced by pragmatic short-hand in the use of the terms ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’. Put simply, paramilitaries carry out ‘punishment’ beatings and those at the receiving end are victims. Therein lie a number of problems. The use of the term ‘punishment’, as Kennedy (1995) suggests, is value-laden in that it carries a presumption that the victim somehow deserves what is meted out by the paramilitaries. Moreover, it can conjure up an image of chastisement, threatening behaviour and minor physical violence. This point is taken up in a parliamentary debate on the issue:
	The term ‘punishment beating’ sounds like a modest extension of neighbourhood watch - at the very worst some vigilante group modestly beating up drug dealers or vandals. Let us make it absolutely clear what is going on in Northern Ireland. We are talking of mutilation, and of beatings in which every bone in the victim’s body is deliberately broken. It is intimidation of the very worst sort, and often leads to exile (Andrew MacKay, Conservative Opposition Spokesperson on Northern Ireland: Parliamentary Debate - House of Commons 27 January 1999).
Such emotive language must however be set in the context of the collapse in the bipartisan political approach to Northern Ireland affairs. A parliamentary debate on ‘punishment’ attacks formed the basis of a motion in the Commons to halt the early release of terrorist prisoners and afforded anti-Agreement Unionists and Conservatives a platform to embarrass the government. This represents the politicisation of the kind of differentiated victim status described previously by Rolston (2000). Conservative Party support for victims of paramilitary violence (the ‘ideal victim’) must be set alongside their ambivalence in endorsing the Labour Government’s inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday​[7]​. 
The term ‘victim’ can disempower those who have been the subject of such attacks and beatings. There is what Beattie and Doherty (1995) describe in their accounts of paramilitary-related violence, as the ‘subtle negotiation of blame’ away from the perpetrator to the victim. In a television interview by the hospital bedside of a 13 year old boy beaten by the paramilitaries, for example, his mother stated while he might be 'bad' like any other local young person, 'other kids do it and they don't get batons taken to them'. The onus is shifted to the victim to defend the reasons why they might have been attacked, an a priori assumption of guilt popularly expressed as ‘he/she didn’t get it for nothing’. 

This description of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland serves to reinforce some of the key explanatory factors for victimisation outlined by Sparks (1982). He argued that if the victim facilitated crime by placing himself/herself at special risk, initiated the events which led to being assaulted, and was vulnerable due to illegal activity, this provided assailants with a degree of impunity and increased the likelihood of victimisation. This would typically apply to joyriding, a euphemistic term for stealing cars and driving them recklessly at high speed often to attract the attention of the paramilitaries or police - an ongoing problem in urban areas of Belfast. Those who engage in violent crimes and vandalism are at a greater risk of being victims (Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta, 1999). Victimisation, in turn, increases the probability of violent offending (Baron and Hartnagel, 1998).

Victims and the community

To understand why the victims have become ‘deserving’ of the violent wrath of the paramilitaries requires an appreciation of the circumstances within which these ‘punishment’ attacks take place. The current policing and criminal justice systems lack credibility in many of the working class areas of Northern Ireland​[8]​. People within these communities have become alienated from the state through their dealings with the RUC and the formal system of criminal justice. On the republican side this alienation is, in part, ideologically driven through their lack of acceptance of a (mainly Protestant) British police force. 

As one interviewee explained:

	The RUC first of all don’t have my respect and don’t have the respect of the vast majority of people in this area. My first memory was of British soldiers and peelers coming into the house trailing my sister out of bed, calling her a Fenian whore. I didn’t know what a whore meant, didn’t even know what a Fenian meant. I was only four years of age and through the culture and traditions that we’ve been brought up with, it’s not the thing to go and phone up the RUC and say ‘I need help’. When you’ve seen the RUC coming into your houses week after week, coming into your community, abusing it, destroying it. They are not the guardians of the law, they have become the abusers. There’s no way round it. You can’t bring them to court. You try to and the charges are thrown out, you’re told you’re telling lies. There is no respect for the RUC. (Interview with ‘punishment’ victim, December 1999).

On the loyalist side it is more to do with what they perceive as the inefficacy of the existing system – perpetrators are dealt with too leniently or the process takes too long. This policing and justice vacuum has resulted in communities turning to paramilitaries as the alternative means of tackling criminal activity in their areas. This is described by a focus group participant in a loyalist community as follows:

	Whilst I do not agree personally with physically hurting someone, at times it has proved purposeful in controlling things that went on within our community, simply because taking them to court doesn’t work…I know young lads who were put on probation for stealing cars. The first week they went to the Probation Board they talked about the consequences of their actions for victims. The next week they were taken go-karting, then deep-sea fishing. The average mother cannot afford to send her kids to these activities. I then heard one young fella who hadn’t been involved in crime ask ‘how do you join the probation club for week-ends away?’ People see these young lads who have committed quite serious crime being taken by the hand without punishment for their actions against the community. (Interview with focus group, Shankill – Belfast, November 1999).

Paramilitaries therefore claim to be responding to popular pressure and in turn engage in swift and often brutal ‘punishments’ carried out without regard for the human rights of the victim or due legal process. The system becomes self-perpetuating and reinforcing. It satisfies the response of communities for ‘justice’ and reinforces the dominant role of paramilitaries who wish to exert social control in their areas. This culture of violence also means that communities are afraid to speak out against such activities. When young people in these areas become involved in criminal behaviour they are more likely to encounter paramilitaries than the police. Some see this as a challenge and part of a sub-culture of bravado amongst their peer group. Rarely however can they match the weaponry or force of organised paramilitary ‘punishment’ gangs who administer the informal criminal justice system under the guise of community ‘police’. 

What is difficult to understand however is the acceptance by some of the victims of their ‘deserving’ fate at the hands of paramilitaries, indeed even their compliance with the informal system. This has led, for example, to ‘punishment’ attacks and shooting being carried out by mutual arrangement between paramilitaries and victims, or ‘punishment’ by appointment. In one case the police had chased two men involved in a robbery into a republican area. The paramilitaries who had no knowledge of the robbery and were receiving none of the proceeds accused the perpetrators of drawing the police into the area. One of those ‘accused’ takes up the story:

	I was put under house arrest by the paramilitaries and interrogated. They came in put a statement of guilt in front of me. I said ‘no, I’m not admitting my part in it, I didn’t do it’ and they said, ‘you’re being stupid here, you’ll only end up getting shot’. From that moment I felt nothing but anger. There was a guy actually walked us round the entry (alley-way) and I said to him ‘look, we’re not going anywhere, we’re going to take what we have to take and that’s it’.  We were actually waiting for the gunman to come round and shoot us. We decided at the end of the day it was a couple of bullets in the legs and at least after that there would be no comeback. A guy came ten minutes later with a gun. The first thing he said was ‘lads, I’m sorry, I’m only doing what I’m told’ and I said ‘no problem’ but at the same time was still very angry. He shot me in the back of the leg, it was just a thud, but the next shot flipped my whole body over. The sensation I always remember is how warm your own blood is. So he moved across and shot the other guy in the legs. He passed out. (Interview with ‘punishment’ victim, November 1999).
Such attacks do not recognise due process and summary justice carried out in this way, based upon accusation and hearsay, has led to notable ‘mistakes’. John Brown, an 80-year-old Belfast senior citizen, was shot in the knees and ankles by a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) gang who mistakenly identified him as a convicted paedophile. They subsequently apologised for their actions. In Strabane a masked squad of paramilitaries burst into a man’s house and beat him with baseball bats and an iron bar before realising their intended target lived next door. They regrouped and inflicted multiple injuries on his neighbour. As one interviewee remarked: 

Obviously a lot of people were ‘done’ wrongly because people were prepared to stand up and give false evidence and there are also cases of mistaken identity. I know a man who lives on this street. He was one of nine people who were kneecapped in this area in one night because they robbed a post office and they closed the post office down. It meant that all the locals had to go to the city centre to cash pensions, dole and family allowance. They went round and shot the nine of them on the basis of information from one person who had been involved in it. He named the other eight and one of the people he named was just a guy he didn’t like! They didn’t wait to question them, they just shot the other eight. (Interview with ‘punishment’ victim, December 1999).
One young man accused of assaulting and robbing a local insurance agent who collected money door-to-door describes the interrogation process by the paramilitaries and lack of due process.

They put it to me that I had robbed this person. They said ‘look, you admit to us and we’ll shoot you once, but see if you don’t admit to it, I don’t give a fuck because we have the proof and we have evidence here, and if we have to get people and bring them in, we’re going to shoot you three or four times’. These guys say to you ‘look, we’re going to shoot you once’, but when you lie face-down waiting for I, you still think they’re going to shoot you in the fucking head or they’re going to shoot you four times or whatever. (Interview with ‘punishment’ victim, December 1999).





The many victims of violence in Northern Ireland have been acknowledged as worthy of at least equal status to other protagonists in the conflict, albeit as a belated government reaction to public disquiet over prisoner releases. The political controversy over degrees of victimhood will continue to reflect the wider debate about the acceptability of the cause which rendered them victims. It is unlikely, for example, that RUC personnel who lost their lives in-service will ever be seen as victims from a republican perspective. Rather dead IRA volunteers are characterised as victims of a war against British occupation. A shared view of victimhood becomes difficult to attain because the status of victims is differentiated according to a scale which reflects their political ascription in Northern Ireland’s conflict. What is important here however is that, as Richardson and May (1999) have argued in a different context, the evaluation of victim status can significantly influence assessment of the degree of culpability attributed to perpetrators. Nowhere is this more clearly obvious than victims of paramilitary ‘punishment’ attacks. What makes this issue all the more significant is the insidious nature of violence which continues to pervade communities in a ‘post-conflict’ scenario. One journalistic claimed that ‘the greatest expenditure of bullets from the handguns of the IRA, even before the cease-fires, was into the legs of Catholic young people in west Belfast’ (O’Doherty, speaking on Channel 4 News, 21st May 2000). Because communities identify the victim as the type of person likely to be involved in petty crime, then the culpability of the perpetrator is abated. Given that the RUC does not have a normal policing role in these communities, the actions of the paramilitaries are portrayed as justifiable. Perpetrators become community protectors operating with a populist mandate to uphold the law outside the parameters of the formal justice system, providing no safeguards for the rights of victims. In these ‘abnormal’ circumstances communities can assume the moral high ground and detach themselves from the punitive actions of paramilitaries yet at the same time demand harsher sentences for ‘offenders’. Paramilitaries can be seen to be protecting their communities yet simultaneously using the informal justice system to exert violent control and further their own self-interests. 

There have been attempts to address this problem through restorative justice schemes established on the principle of reparation rather than retribution. Repairing damaged relationships between victims, offenders and the community is at the heart of this process (McEvoy, 1999). Although noteworthy in their mainly voluntary efforts to address the problem, the endorsement of such initiatives by paramilitary groups and the involvement of ex-prisoners in their operation have met with criticism. The burgeoning restorative justice projects in republican areas have been described as ‘the Provo police force’, at odds with the voluntary nature of perpetrator compliance which is pivotal to the scheme. Moreover their refusal to co-operate with the RUC in the day-to-day business of restorative justice has been censured. The recent review of the criminal justice system, for example, expressed several concerns. These included the view that paramilitaries have only become involved in restorative justice because it offers another mechanism for community control in the face of increasing unacceptability of ‘punishment’ attacks. These schemes were also criticised for the environment of coercion and threat within which they operate where the ultimate sanction for non-compliance is violence and the rights of the offender can be abused (Criminal Justice Review Group, 2000: 196-197). In response, community restorative activists argue that they did not create the conditions which led to the RUC being isolated from republican/nationalist communities and it is therefore up to the police to satisfy those communities of their future integrity. It is too much to expect volunteer-based restorative justice programmes to tackle systemic deficiencies in police-community relations.

There are close parallels here with the informal justice system in the townships of South Africa where street committees or people’s courts were established to discipline aberrant residents. These ‘courts’ were legitimised through popular support during the repressive apartheid era and informal justice administered through fines, compensation, community service, lashes (sjambok) to youths with parental consent and eviction from the township or squatter camp (Ramphele, 1997; Monaghan, 1999). Post-apartheid, the support for informal justice continues in these communities which have little confidence in attempts to restore state law and order. Lessons for Northern are gloomily prophetic.
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^1	  There is some variation in the figures for deaths resulting from the conflict, depending on what types of incidents were included in the database. Official RUC data show a total of 3,296 deaths between 1969-1999. The Cost of the Troubles Study shows 3,601 deaths between 1969-1998 (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth, 1998). The Lost Lives database records 3,636 deaths between 1966-1999 (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, 1999).
^2	  Under an early release scheme, set up in 1995, determinate sentence prisoners were entitled to automatic release at the half way point of sentence. The Belfast Agreement allows automatic release at the one-third point and is implemented through a Sentence Review Body. Prisoners who qualify are released on licence and returned to prison if they engage in any further activity.
^3	  Adopted in the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.
^4	  The figures show that loyalists were responsible for 42% of the shootings and 45% of the beatings, republicans carried out the remainder.
^5	  Violent crime includes offences against the person, robbery and sexual offences.
^6	  Criminal Injuries (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order 1988
^7	  The Conservative Leader William Hague in a Commons debate at which the Prime Minster announced a public inquiry into Bloody Sunday said ‘we are naturally sceptical about reopening an inquiry which was conducted 25 years ago, especially since previous governments have already examined new evidence submitted to them’ (Hansard, 29 January 1998: 503).
^8	  The police and criminal justice system are the subject of current reviews arising from the Belfast Agreement. Both have reported: A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland (1999) and the Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland (2000) respectively.
^9	  A recent Home Office Report on international crime statistics showed Northern Ireland’s percentage increase in recorded crime (28%) was second only to South Africa where it rose by 37% in 1998. Northern Ireland also experienced the largest rise of the 29 countries examined in the report in the area of recorded violent crime, with an increase of 21%, while England and Wales, and Ireland recorded decreases of 6% and 17% respectively (Barclay and Tavares, 2000)
^10	  The Ulster Democratic Party is linked to the UDA, the Progressive Unionist Party to the UVF, and Sinn Fein to the Provisional IRA.
